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ABSTRACT
How does a country's productivity growth affect worldwide real incomes through international trade?
In this paper, we take this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover effects of China's
productivity growth. Our framework features traditional terms-of-trade effects and new trade home
market effects as suggested by the theoretical literature and works from a reference point which perfectly
matches industry-level trade. Focusing on the years 1995 to 2007, we find that the cumulative welfare
effect on individual regions ranges between -1.2 percent and 3.6 percent and only 3.0 percent of the
worldwide gains of China's productivity growth accrue to the rest of the world.
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One of the classic propositions of international economics is that a country￿ s productivity
growth can not only bene￿t but also harm its trading partners. In traditional models of inter-
industry trade based on comparative advantage, productivity shocks transmit only through
terms-of-trade e⁄ects. They tend to bene￿t the trading partners if productivity growth is
biased towards export-oriented industries and harm the trading partners otherwise (Hicks,
1953). In newer models of intra-industry trade based on product di⁄erentiation, productivity
shocks also transmit through home market e⁄ects. They tend to bene￿t the trading partners
if productivity growth is biased towards industries with a relatively high trade elasticity and
harm the trading partners otherwise (Venables, 1987).
Speci￿cally, if a country￿ s productivity growth is biased towards export-oriented industries,
its trading partners￿imports become cheaper relative to their exports so that their exports
command more imports in world markets. The resulting welfare gains are the traditional
terms-of-trade e⁄ects mentioned above. Moreover, if a country￿ s productivity growth is biased
towards industries with a relatively high trade elasticity, the increase in its trading partners￿
aggregate price indices resulting from domestic exit out of these industries is smaller than the
decrease in their aggregate price indices resulting from domestic entry into the other industries
so that their aggregate price indices fall overall. The ensuing welfare gains are the new trade
home market e⁄ects referred to above.1
In this paper, we take this proposition to the data by measuring the global spillover
e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth. We focus on two-digit manufacturing industries and
the years 1995 to 2007. We ￿nd that the pattern of China￿ s productivity growth exhibits no
strong correlation with the export-orientation or trade elasticity of China￿ s industries so that
the resulting spillover e⁄ects are relatively small. Speci￿cally, our analysis suggests that the
welfare of China￿ s trading partners increases by a cumulative 0.7 percent due to terms-of-trade
1In a Krugman (1980) model, the trade elasticity would be the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
In a Melitz (2003) model in which ￿rm productivities are Pareto distributed, the trade elasticity would be the
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution.
2e⁄ects but decreases by a cumulative 0.3 percent due to home market e⁄ects on average. The
cumulative welfare e⁄ect on individual regions ranges between -1.2 percent for Russia and
3.6 percent for Asia (except Japan) and only 3.0 percent of the worldwide gains of China￿ s
productivity growth accrue to the rest of the world. In the US, welfare rises by a cumulative
0.4 percent due to China￿ s productivity growth.
Our analysis is based on a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model of
international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817), intra-industry trade
as in Krugman (1980), and ￿rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003). On the theoretical side, it
features terms-of-trade e⁄ects as well as home market e⁄ects which seems desirable in light
of the forecited theoretical results. On the empirical side, it implies an industry-level gravity
structure which allows us to measure the spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth
from a reference point which perfectly matches worldwide industry-level trade. The ￿rm-
level dimension is not essential to account for terms-of-trade and home market e⁄ects, but is
important to correct for Melitz (2003) selection e⁄ects when estimating China￿ s productivity
growth.
Despite the considerable attention our subject received in the theoretical literature, there
is relatively little related empirical work. Our paper is preceded mainly by Eaton and Ko-
rtum (2002) who illustrate their seminal framework by quantifying the spillover e⁄ects of
hypothetical US and German productivity shocks on other OECD countries. Eaton and Kor-
tum￿ s framework features only terms-of-trade e⁄ects but no home market e⁄ects and therefore
ignores one of the channels through which productivity shocks transmit. Also, it predicts full
specialization according to comparative advantage but allows only for aggregate productivity
shocks so that productivity growth is always export-biased in e⁄ect.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical frame-
2Fieler (forthcoming) provides a similar exercise in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with non-homothetic
preferences. Additional work has emerged after our paper. Levchenko and Zhang (2011) calibrate a multi-sector
Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to quantify the e⁄ects of changes in Ricardian comparative advantage. Di
Giovanni et al (2011) build on this and assess the welfare impact of China￿ s trade integration and technological
change.
3work: it describes the basic setup, characterizes the equilibrium for given productivities, shows
how to calculate the general equilibrium e⁄ects of productivity shocks, and demonstrates how
to isolate the welfare e⁄ects of productivity shocks. Section 3 turns to the empirical applica-
tion: it introduces the data, describes the estimation of the model parameters, explains the
estimation of China￿ s productivity growth, and reports the empirical results.3
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Basic setup
Our framework is based on a multi-industry extension of the Melitz (2003) model used by
Arkolakis et al (2011). There are  countries and  industries. Each industry provides
consumers with a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties. Preferences over these varieties are
















where  is the quantity of an industry  variety from country  consumed in country ,
 is the number of industry  varieties from country  available in country , ￿  1 is
the elasticity of substitution between industry  varieties, and ￿ is the fraction of country
 income spent on industry  varieties.
Firms are technologically heterogeneous which is captured by the following production
process. Entrants into industry  of country  have to hire 
 units of labor in country  to







￿xed cost of entry,  is the Pareto location parameter, and ￿ is the Pareto shape parameter.
Entrants into industry  of country  wishing to sell to country  further need to hire
￿

units of labor in country  and  units of labor in country  to deliver  units of output to
3In the interest of brevity, derivations are kept to a minimum in the main text. A detailed technical appendix
is available upon request.
4country , where ￿ ￿ 1 is an iceberg trade barrier and  is a ￿xed cost of serving market
. Both the number of entrants into industry  of country  
 and the fraction of entrants




Given only these basics, we can already anticipate some of the roles the model￿ s traditional
and new trade elements will play. In particular, the model will feature inter-industry trade
as in Ricardo (1817) since the productivity distributions vary by country and industry. Also,
there will be intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980) since goods are di⁄erentiated and
consumers value variety. We will model an industry￿ s productivity growth as an increase in
the Pareto location parameter  which shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity
draws to the right. Since this will lead to changes in the number of entrants, productivity
growth will not only have terms-of-trade e⁄ects but also home market e⁄ects which would not
arise in Eaton and Kortum (2002) type environments.
2.2 Equilibrium for given productivities







where  is the delivered price of an industry  variety,  the ideal price index of all industry
 varieties,  the wage rate, and  the number of consumers or workers.

















￿¬ 1 denotes the productivity cuto⁄ above which revenues are
su¢ ciently high to justify incurring the ￿xed costs of serving market .
4In order to clearly expose the novel features of our framework, we do not allow for intermediate goods or
nontraded goods which is in line with much of the theoretical literature. The idea is that intermediate goods
tend to magnify the spillover e⁄ects of productivity shocks while nontraded goods tend to dampen the spillover
e⁄ects of productivity shocks so that abstracting from both seems like a reasonable simpli￿cation.
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where e  = (
R 1
￿
 ￿¬1(j  
￿))
1
￿¬ 1 denotes the productivity of the representa-





 by imposing the Pareto assumption.















where (  
￿
) = ( 
￿
)
￿ is the probability that an entrant into industry  of country
 sells to country  and (￿j  
￿
) = ￿¬1
￿¬￿+1 are the expected operating pro￿ts
of an entrant into industry  of country  from selling to country  conditional on selling to
country .











￿￿ ￿ is the fraction of country  workers hired by country  entrants
to cover their ￿xed costs of entry as well as their variable costs of production and (￿+1)

captures the expected number of workers required by entrants into industry  of country  to
cover their ￿xed costs of entry as well as their variable costs of production.
6Upon noticing that = ( 
￿
)￿
























Together with condition (6), this represents a system of N+NS equations in the N+NS un-
knowns  and 
 which can be solved up to a numeraire. An obvious problem, however,
is that this system depends on a large set of unknown parameters which are all di¢ cult to
estimate empirically.
2.3 General equilibrium e⁄ects of productivity shocks
We avoid this problem by computing the general equilibrium e⁄ects of productivity shocks
using a method inspired by Dekle et al (2007). In particular, conditions (6) and (7) can be




















￿¬￿ b  (9)


















, and  denotes the factual value of industry
 trade from country  to country .
Equations (8) and (9) represent a system of N+NS equations in the N+NS unknowns b 
and c 
. Crucially, their coe¢ cients depend on ￿, ￿, and observable trade ￿ ows only so that
the full general equilibrium response to productivity shocks can be determined without further
information on any of the remaining model parameters. Notice that this procedure ensures
that the general equilibrium e⁄ects are calculated from a reference point which perfectly
matches industry-level trade. Essentially, it imposes a restriction on the set of unknown
7parameters f￿
g such that the predicted  perfectly match the observed
 for given values of ￿ and ￿.
To provide a sense of the nature of these general equilibrium adjustments, Table 1 reports
the e⁄ects of a hypothetical productivity shock in a simple example economy consisting of
two countries (China and the US) and two industries (1 and 2). Productivity is assumed to
grow by 10 percent in industry 1 of China and trade ￿ ows are taken to be fully symmetric
as detailed in the note to Table 1. As can be seen, the productivity growth in industry 1 of
China is predicted to cause an increase in the relative wage of China as well as entry into
industry 1 of China, exit out of industry 1 of the US, exit out of industry 2 of China, and
entry into industry 2 of the US.
Intuitively, expected pro￿ts from entering into industry 1 become positive in China and
negative in the US. As a result, there is entry into industry 1 of China bidding up wages
so that there is also exit out of industry 2. Also, there is exit out of industry 1 of the US
depressing wages so that there is also entry into industry 2. The pattern of entry and exit
can also be understood in terms of two basic equilibrium constraints. First, labor market
clearing requires that entry into one industry leads to exit out of the other industry in the
same country. Second, constant expenditure shares imply that entry into one industry leads
to exit out of the same industry in the other country.
2.4 Welfare e⁄ects of productivity shocks
Given these general equilibrium adjustments of productivity shocks, the implied welfare e⁄ects
can be computed relatively straightforwardly. Changes in welfare are given by changes in real
labor income which are changes in nominal labor income de￿ ated by changes in the ideal
aggregate price index: b  =
 
 
. Given the Cobb-Douglas structure of aggregate preferences,





The trick is now to express changes in the ideal industry price indices as functions of changes
in wages and entry only. This can be accomplished by rewriting equation (4) in changes after
8substituting the relationship  = ( 
￿
)￿
 and the de￿nitions of ￿
 and e  which




























To understand precisely how productivity shocks a⁄ect welfare, it is useful to begin by con-
trasting two linear approximations of the growth rates of industry price indices. The ￿rst fol-
lows from equation (4) and reveals that changes in industry price indices are expenditure share
weighted averages of changes in average prices and elasticity of substitution adjusted changes











The second follows from the expression for b  given above and shows that productivity shocks












 ). The links between these two approximations




and the de￿nitions of ￿
 and e .




 ￿ 0 which implies that changes in available variety
have no net e⁄ect on industry price indices so that the last term out of the ￿rst approximation
simply drops out. The basic intuition for this result can be understood by considering the
following variety e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth on the US economy. On the one
hand, China￿ s productivity growth implies that more Chinese varieties become available to
US consumers as additional Chinese ￿rms start exporting to the US. On the other hand,
China￿ s productivity growth means that fewer US varieties remain available to US consumers
since some US ￿rms are forced to shut down. The price index implications of these two
e⁄ects are exactly o⁄setting so that changes in the overall number of varieties available to US
consumers can be ignored.






















9that only changes in average productivity induced either directly by changes in  or indirectly
by changes in 
 have a net e⁄ect on . A corollary is that the basic Melitz (2003) selection
e⁄ects also cancel which is not too surprising since they mirror the abovementioned variety
e⁄ects. One the one hand, the fact that additional Chinese ￿rms start exporting to the US
means that the average productivity of Chinese ￿rms serving the US market grows at a slower
rate than China￿ s productivity since these additional ￿rms have below average productivity.
On the other hand, the fact that some US ￿rms are forced to shut down means that the
average productivity of US ￿rms serving the US market rises since the surviving ￿rms have
above average productivity.6
The only Melitz (2003) selection e⁄ects which continue to matter are the entry e⁄ects
known from Bernard et al (2007). Their basic intuition can be understood by considering
how industry 1 of the US is a⁄ected by productivity growth in industry 1 of China. The
resulting exit out of industry 1 of the US reduces competition in industry 1 of the US which
increases the industry 1 price index of the US by allowing some lower productivity ￿rms to
serve the US market. At the same time, the resulting entry into industry 1 of China increases
competition in industry 1 of the US which decreases the industry price index of the US by
forcing some lower productivity ￿rms out of the US market. Under a realistic parametrization
of industry expenditure shares, entry in the US has a stronger e⁄ect on US competition than
entry in China so that the former e⁄ect dominates.
Given this background on how productivity shocks a⁄ect industry price indices, it is now





















 ) from above. The resulting
6These ￿ndings are related to the recent results by Arkolakis et al (2011), Feenstra (2009), and Atkeson and
Burstein (2010) that changes in trade barriers often have similar aggregate e⁄ects in models with and without
￿rm heterogeneity. The ￿rm-level dimension of our setup proves useful in our empirical application where it
allows us to correct for Melitz (2003) selection e⁄ects when estimating China￿ s productivity growth.





















































is the traditional terms-
of-trade e⁄ect emphasized by Hicks (1953). It captures the direct e⁄ect changes in wages
and productivities have on the prices of the goods produced by country  relative to the
direct e⁄ect changes in wages and productivities have on the prices of the goods consumed by
country . Country  bene￿ts from an increase in the price of its production bundle relative












 is the new trade home market e⁄ect in Venables
(1987). It captures the indirect e⁄ect adjustments in entry and exit have on the aggregate price
index in country . Recall that entry into one industry of country  always comes along with
exit out of another industry in country . Recall also that entry into an industry of country 
typically reduces the price index of that industry in country . Hence, the counteracting entry
e⁄ects give rise to counteracting industry price index e⁄ects so that the sign of the aggregate











 is the e⁄ect productivity shocks in
country  have on welfare in country  under autarky as follows straightforwardly from setting
 = 1 in equations (9) and (11). It simply says that a country￿ s welfare growth under
autarky is an expenditure share weighted average of that country￿ s industry-level productivity
growth as one intuitively expects. The previous two terms therefore capture the additional
e⁄ects arising under trade relative to autarky and thereby identify the channels through which
productivity shocks transmit under trade.7
7Internationally, the terms-of-trade and home market e⁄ects have a zero sum character. This can be seen
most clearly in the special case ￿ = ￿ and ￿ = ￿ for all  since the worldwide average welfare e⁄ect is
then completely independent of terms-of-trade and home market e⁄ects. In particular, it can be shown that





















11To illustrate the key determinants of the signs of these spillover e⁄ects, we now return to
our simple example economy introduced above. Table 2 reports the e⁄ects of a hypothetical 10
percent productivity growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare for three di⁄erent scenarios:
China is a net exporter in industry 1, China is a net importer in industry 1, and there is no
inter-industry trade. As one expects from the classic literature, the US experiences a terms-of-
trade gain if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards China￿ s export-oriented industry
but a terms-of-trade loss if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards China￿ s import-
competing industry.
One subtle di⁄erence from the textbook analysis is that the terms-of-trade gain the US
experiences if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards China￿ s export-oriented industry
exceeds the terms-of-trade loss it experiences if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards
China￿ s import-competing industry. This is also re￿ ected in the fact that the US experiences
a positive terms-of-trade e⁄ect even if there is no inter-industry trade. This di⁄erence is due
to the existence of Krugman (1980) type intra-industry trade. In a sense, productivity growth
always features an export-bias in a Krugman (1980) model since each country specializes in
a unique set of varieties.
Table 3 returns to the case of fully symmetric trade ￿ ows and illustrates the role played
by cross-industry di⁄erences in ￿. It again reports the e⁄ects of a 10 percent productivity
growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare. As can be seen, the US experiences a positive
home market e⁄ect if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards the high ￿ industry and
a negative home market e⁄ect if it is biased towards the low ￿ industry. The intuition is
that the ￿ parameters govern the strengths of the counteracting industry price index e⁄ects.
If ￿ is low, there is a lot of variation in ￿rm productivity so that changes in the number of
entrants lead to large changes in average productivity.
For example, if China￿ s productivity growth is biased towards the high ￿ industry, there
is exit out of the high ￿ industry in the US which tends to increase the aggregate price index
in the US. At the same time, there is also entry into the low ￿ industry in the US which tends
12to decrease the aggregate price index in the US. However, the latter e⁄ect tends to dominate
the former e⁄ect since changes in the number of entrants induce larger changes in average
productivity in the low ￿ industry. This is because ￿rm productivity is more dispersed in
the low ￿ industry so that adding or dropping marginal ￿rms has a larger e⁄ect on average
productivity in that industry.
Overall, this discussion suggests two key determinants of the sign of the global spillover
e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth: the correlation between China￿ s productivity growth
and China￿ s export-orientation, and the correlation between China￿ s productivity growth and
the Pareto shape parameters ￿ which can alternatively be interpreted as trade elasticities
in this environment. Of course, the magnitude of the global spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s pro-
ductivity growth also depends critically on the pattern and volume of international trade as
captured by the import shares ￿￿ in equation (11).
3 Empirical application
We now apply our framework to isolate and decompose the spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s pro-
ductivity growth between 1995 and 2007.8 For this purpose, we need the complete matrix of
industry-level trade ￿ ows , industry-level estimates of the elasticity parameters ￿ and ￿,
and industry-level estimates of China￿ s productivity growths b . We obtain this information
on an annual basis for 34 2-digit manufacturing industries and 17 countries or regions com-
prising the world. We explicitly include only the largest economies and aggregate all other
countries by nearest continent.
8Before we apply our framework, we actually extend it in two simple ways. First, we introduce an exogenous
trade surplus parameter along the lines of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to deal with the aggregate trade imbalances
observed empirically. Second, we relax the implicit assumption that the free entry condition always binds in all
countries and industries to allow for possible corner solutions in which some countries abandon some industries
entirely. We discuss the resulting generalizations of equations (8) - (10) together with our solution algorithm
in the appendix.
133.1 Estimation procedure for 
Our data on international trade ￿ ows is from the standard NBER-UN database which covers
most countries in the world.9 For the US and China, we compute internal trade ￿ ows as
industry output minus industry exports which we take from the standard NBER-CES database
and the Annual Survey of Industrial Production. The Annual Survey of Industrial Production
is a census of all state-owned plants and all large private plants collected by China￿ s National
Bureau of Statistics. Additional details on this dataset can be found, for example, in Hsieh
and Klenow (2009).10
For all other countries, we estimate internal trade ￿ ows from aggregate production data
using the following procedure: First, we impute aggregate output by dividing aggregate value
added from the standard World Bank-WDI database by 0.312 which is the number for value
added reported by Dekle et al (2007). Then, we compute aggregate expenditure from aggre-
gate output, minus aggregate exports, plus aggregate imports. Finally, we calculate internal
trade ￿ ows by multiplying aggregate expenditure with US industry expenditure shares and
subtracting industry imports.
3.2 Estimation procedure for ￿ and ￿
We estimate the demand elasticities ￿ using the theoretical prediction that industry wage
payments are proportional to industry revenues with the factor of proportionality being equal
to ￿¬1
￿ .11 Instead of using wage payments, we use factor payments, that is the sum of
payments to capital and labor. Calculating factor payments involves the rental rate of capital
which we obtain by assuming that the sum of factor payments across all industries amounts
9We use the most recent version of this data which was generously made available to us by Robert Feenstra.
10The NBER-CES data is only available until 2005. We estimate internal trade ￿ ows for the US and other
countries in 2006 and 2007 based on the 2005 US industry expenditure shares using the procedure explained
below.
11Strictly speaking, the model predicts that variable industry wage payments are proportional to industry
revenues given the assumption that ￿xed costs are also incurred in terms of labor. We do not take this
assumption literally when taking the model to the data and treat all reported factor payments as variable
factor payments.
14to 2
3 of the sum of revenues across all industries. We make this assumption since it implies a
plausible aggregate pro￿t share of 1
3.
We estimate the trade elasticities ￿ using the estimates of ￿ and the theoretical prediction
that ￿rm sales follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter ￿
￿¬1 within industries. We
follow Eaton et al (forthcoming) in restricting attention to exporters only and back out the
shape parameter of the ￿rm sales distribution from a regression of the logarithm of the ￿rm
sales rank on the logarithm of ￿rm sales. For our estimation of ￿ and ￿, we use data on
wage payments, capital stocks, and ￿rm sales from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial
Production described above.
3.3 Estimation procedure for b 
Our estimation of China￿ s productivity growth proceeds in two steps. In the ￿rst step, we
estimate the productivity growth of the representative Chinese ￿rm in each industry b e .
In the second step, we calculate the fundamental Chinese productivity growth b  in each
industry from b e  by correcting for Melitz (2003) selection e⁄ects. Recall that an increase in
the Pareto location parameter  shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity draws
to the right. It di⁄ers from e  because not all Chinese entrants ￿nd it optimal to serve the
Chinese market given the ￿xed costs .
Our model suggests to estimate b e  as the growth rate of real industry output per worker.




 which can be




, where  are
the total sales in industry  of country  and  is the total employment in industry 
of country .12 The representative price  (e ) is an output share weighted average of
the prices charged by domestic producers in the industry which follows from rewriting it as





( ) (j  ￿
).
12Strictly speaking,  is the total employment in industry  of country  net of ￿xed costs because we have
assumed ￿xed costs to be incurred in terms of labor. As explained in the previous footnote, we do not take
this assumption literally when taking the model to the data.
15We estimate b e  using our data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production. Instead
of computing the growth rate of industry output per worker, we compute the growth rate
of industry output per composite factor of production which we take to be a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of capital and labor. We calculate the labor shares from the shares of wage payments
in industry revenues net of pro￿ts and the capital shares as the residuals of these labor shares.
We proxy for the representative price  (e ) using producer price de￿ ators which we obtain
from the China Statistical Yearbook.
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corrects for the e⁄ects changes in trade openness have on representative productivity (the
Melitz (2003) selection e⁄ects). It is well-known that such selection e⁄ects are often important
and ignoring them would have indeed biased our productivity growth estimates for some
industries to a sizeable degree.13
3.4 Results
Table 4 reports the share of manufacturing imports from all countries in domestic manufac-
turing expenditure by country. Excluding China, this share has increased from 20.8 percent
to 26.6 percent over the sample period on average. Table 5 presents the share of manufac-
turing imports from China in domestic manufacturing expenditure by country. Excluding
China, this share has increased from 1.1 percent to 3.9 percent over the sample period on
average. While manufacturing imports from China therefore only account for 5.3 percent of
total manufacturing imports in 1995 on average, they already account for 14.7 percent of total
manufacturing imports in 2007 on average, re￿ ecting the rising importance of China to the
world economy.
Table 6 lists our estimates for the elasticities ￿ and ￿ for all industries. As can be seen,
13In particular, the correction ranges from -5.8 percentage points until 0.4 percentage points and averages
-0.2 percentage points for the annualized productivity growth estimates which we present below.
16our estimates of ￿ range from 1.7 to 19.5 and average 7.4 and our estimates of ￿ range
from 0.8 to 22.0 and average 7.9. These averages are within the range of existing estimates
found in the literature. Eaton and Kortum (2002), for example, estimate the trade elasticity
to be 3.6 in one speci￿cation and 8.3 in another speci￿cation. Notice that our estimates of
￿ and ￿ are such ￿ is sightly larger that ￿ ¬ 1 throughout. This is consistent with our
earlier theoretical assumption that ￿  ￿ ¬1 and implies that the sales distribution slightly
deviates from Zipf￿ s law. It ensures that the expected pro￿ts of entrants are always ￿nite in
all industries.
To attenuate possible measurement error in our productivity growth estimation, we take
China￿ s productivity growth rates in each year to be the geometric average of the estimated
productivity growth rates over all years. These averages are also listed in Table 6 and their
distribution is plotted in Figure 1. As can be seen, China￿ s productivity growth rates are
large and vary substantially across industries. They range from 7.4 percent to 24.3 percent
and average 13.8 percent. Figures 2 and 3 relate these productivity growth rates to China￿ s
export-orientation and the trade elasticity ￿. Most notably, there is no strong correlation
visible in either ￿gure which suggests that the spillover e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth
will not be large.
Figure 4 plots the distribution across China￿ s trading partners of the simple average of the
predicted annual changes in wages relative to China￿ s wage over all years.14 The underlying
annual wage changes are computed from the extensions of equations (8) and (9) given in the
appendix and capture what would have happened to relative wages if nothing but China￿ s
productivity had changed. Not surprisingly, all countries￿wages are predicted to fall relative
to China￿ s wage. The predicted wage adjustments range from -11.0 percent to -10.4 percent
and average -10.8 percent. Notice that China￿ s productivity growth slightly exceeds China￿ s
relative wage growth on average which indicates that China￿ s trading partners will bene￿t
14Recall that we take "labor" to be a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of capital and labor in our empirical appli-
cation. As a consequence, changes in "wages" should then also be thought of as changes in Cobb-Douglas
aggregates of interest rates and wages. For expositional simplicity, we continue to use the term "wages" in the
text.
17somewhat through terms-of-trade e⁄ects.
The upper panel of Figure 5 plots the simple average of the predicted annual changes in
the number of entrants in China over all years against China￿ s estimated productivity growth.
The underlying annual changes in the number of entrants in China are again computed from
the extensions of equations (8) and (9) given in the appendix and capture what would have
happened to the number of entrants in China if nothing but China￿ s productivity had changed.
Not surprisingly, the model tends to predict entry into China￿ s fast-growing industries and exit
out of China￿ s slow-growing industries. Moreover, the lower panel of Figure 5 illustrates that
the extent of entry and exit in China is particularly large in high trade elasticity industries
as one intuitively expects.
Table 7 summarizes the predicted welfare e⁄ects of China￿ s productivity growth. The
￿rst column gives the predicted welfare e⁄ects on China, the second and third columns the
predicted welfare e⁄ects on the "World" and the "Rest of the World" de￿ned as the output
share weighted averages of the predicted welfare e⁄ects on all countries and all countries other
than China, and the last column the ratios of the entries in columns three and two. The pre-
dicted welfare e⁄ects are computed using the extension of equation (10) given in the appendix
and capture what would have happened to welfare if nothing but China￿ s productivity had
changed. The last row computes the cumulative e⁄ects by taking geometric averages of the
annual e⁄ects in the previous rows.
As can be seen, China￿ s welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 520.5 percent,
"World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 21.18 percent, and "Rest of the
World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 0.634 percent. This implies that only
3.0 percent of the worldwide bene￿ts of China￿ s productivity growth are predicted to spill
over to other countries. There are three main reasons for this result. First, there is no strong
correlation between China￿ s productivity growth and China￿ s export orientation so that there
are no large terms-of-trade e⁄ects. Second, there is no strong correlation between China￿ s
productivity growth and the trade elasticity ￿ so that there are no large home market e⁄ects.
18And ￿nally, the share of Chinese imports in total expenditures is still fairly small in most
countries even though it has grown fast over time.
Table 8 reports the cumulative spillover e⁄ects on all countries and decomposes them
into terms-of-trade and home market e⁄ects following approximation (11). As can be seen,
the welfare e⁄ects range from -1.23 percent to 3.64 percent and average 0.29 percent. The
decomposition reveals that the terms-of-trade e⁄ects are always positive and the home market
e⁄ects are typically negative. The terms-of-trade e⁄ects are always positive despite the slight
negative correlation between China￿ s productivity growth and China￿ s export-orientation due
to the abovementioned Krugman (1980) intra-industry trade e⁄ects. The home market e⁄ects
are typically negative because of the slight negative correlation between China￿ s productivity
growth and the trade elasticity ￿. Notice that part of the variation in the magnitudes of
the spillover e⁄ects is simply explained by the variation in the extent of trade integration
with China documented in Table 5. For example, the welfare e⁄ects on Other Asia are large
because of the strong trade integration with China. Similarly, the welfare e⁄ects on Brazil
are small because of the weak trade integration with China.
Table 9 decomposes the terms-of-trade e⁄ects into their bilateral components vis-a-vis
China and their multilateral components vis-a-vis all other countries. The former component
is the direct e⁄ect of China￿ s productivity growth combined with the indirect e⁄ect resulting
from the adjustments of relative wages vis-a-vis China. The latter component is the indirect
e⁄ect resulting from the adjustments of relative wages vis-a-vis all other countries. China￿ s
productivity growth is often feared to impose strong adverse multilateral terms-of-trade e⁄ects
on economies whose exports compete directly with Chinese exports in third markets.15 While
our analysis con￿rms the existence of such adverse e⁄ects for some emerging economies like
Brazil and Mexico and some manufacturing strongholds like Germany and Japan, it also
suggests that their overall welfare implications are rather small.
15The analysis of Hanson and Robertson (2010) suggests that fears of adverse terms-of-trade e⁄ects are not
unjusti￿ed in the case of Mexico. Using a gravity model, they estimate the e⁄ect of Chinese export growth on
the demand for Mexican products in third markets and ￿nd adverse e⁄ects of up to 4 percent.
194 Conclusion
How does a country￿ s productivity growth a⁄ect worldwide real incomes through international
trade? In this paper, we took this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover e⁄ects
of China￿ s productivity growth. Our framework featured traditional terms-of-trade e⁄ects and
new trade home market e⁄ects as suggested by the theoretical literature and worked from a
reference point which perfectly matched industry-level trade. Focusing on the years 1995 to
2007, we found that the cumulative welfare e⁄ect on individual regions ranged between -1.2
percent and 3.6 percent and only 3.0 percent of the worldwide gains of China￿ s productivity
growth accrued to the rest of the world.
Our analysis is only a ￿rst pass at this question. Of the many possible extensions, a
particularly interesting one would be to let aggregate manufacturing employment respond
endogenously to productivity growth. On the one hand, this would dampen relative wage
growth in China thereby generating additional terms-of-trade gains for the rest of the world.
On the other hand, this would relocate aggregate manufacturing employment to China thereby
in￿ icting additional home market losses on the rest of the world. These counteracting e⁄ects
may well been quantitatively important in the case of China given the extent of rural-urban
migration observed during the sample period.
205 Appendix
As mentioned in footnote (8), we extend our basic framework in two simple ways before taking
it to the data. First, we introduce an exogenous trade surplus parameter  along the lines
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justment terms which reduce to 1 if  = 0.  can be computed from observed industry





Second, we relax the implicit assumption that the free entry condition always binds in
all countries and industries which results in the prediction of negative entry if zero pro￿ts
are not compatible with positive production. Speci￿cally, we do not immediately compute
the counterfactuals with the actual vector of productivity growths but instead take slowly
increasing fractions of it, starting at zero and progressing in one percentage point steps.
Whenever the number of entrants is predicted to be less than 1 percent of its original value
in a particular country and industry, c 
  001, we replace equation (13) for that country
and industry with the condition that there is no entry in that country and industry, c 
 = 0,
thereby imposing a corner solution.
16The factor
(￿¬ 1)(￿+1)
￿￿ is necessary since the model also features endogenous aggregate net exports in
general due to the assumption that the ￿xed cost of exporting are paid in destination country labor which
generates international transfers of income.
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TABLE 1: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on Relative Wages and Entry





4.1% 21.5% -21.5% -22.4% 22.4%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in Chinese wage relative to US wage (column 1), Chinese number
of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns 2 and 3), and US number of entrants in industry 1 and 2 (columns
4 and 5) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1. Simulation assumes that nominal incomes
are the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries and industries, import
expenditure shares are 10% in both countries and industries, theta1=theta2=5, and sigma1=sigma2=3.
24TABLE 2: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
Terms-of-trade + Home market ￿ Total
1  0 0.7% 0.0% 0.8%
1 = 0 0.2% 0.0% 0.4%
1  0 -0.3% 0.0% -0.2%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e⁄ect (column 1) and the
home market e⁄ect (column 2) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1 following equation (11).
Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following equation (10). Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the
same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries and industries, theta1=theta2=5,
and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the ￿rst row, China is assumed to have an import expenditure share of 5% in
industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 15% in industry 2 with the US being the mirror image so that
China is a net exporter in industry 1. In the second row, import expenditure shares are assumed to be 10% in
both countries and industries so that there is only intra-industry trade. In the third row, China is assumed to
have an import expenditure share of 15% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 5% in industry 2
with the US being the mirror image so that China is a net importer in industry 1.
25TABLE 3: Hypothetical E⁄ect of Chinese Productivity Growth on US Welfare
Terms-of-trade + Home market ￿ Total
￿1  ￿2 -0.1% 1.0% 1.0%
￿1 = ￿2 0.2% 0.0% 0.4%
￿1  ￿2 0.4% -0.9% -0.2%
Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e⁄ect (column 1) and the
home market e⁄ect (column 2) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1 following equation (11).
Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following equation (10). Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are
the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries, import expenditure shares
are 10% in both countries and industries, and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the ￿rst row, theta1=7 and theta2=3. In
the second row, theta1=5 and theta2=5. In the third row, theta1=3 and theta2=7.
26TABLE 4: Share of Imports in Total Expenditure
1995 2001 2007
United States 15.8% 21.4% 21.8%
Argentina 11.2% 11.7% 19.7%
Brazil 9.1% 15.9% 13.9%
Canada 36.1% 38.4% 40.0%
France 32.0% 38.1% 40.0%
Germany 22.1% 30.3% 33.9%
India 10.7% 11.1% 17.9%
Italy 20.3% 25.6% 28.2%
Japan 4.8% 7.3% 11.5%
Mexico 30.6% 34.5% 31.7%
Russia - 18.3% 22.4%
United Kingdom 28.1% 30.8% 35.0%
Africa 23.4% 22.1% 31.9%
Other Asia 23.5% 23.0% 23.5%
Other Europe 24.1% 27.8% 28.3%
Other Latin America 20.6% 19.7% 26.1%
Average 20.8% 23.5% 26.6%
Notes: Entries are manufacturing imports/total manufacturing expenditure. We have no trade data for Russia
until 1996.
27TABLE 5: Share of Chinese Imports in Total Expenditure
1995 2001 2007
United States 2.3% 3.5% 5.6%
Argentina 0.6% 0.9% 2.7%
Brazil 0.5% 0.6% 1.7%
Canada 1.4% 2.1% 4.6%
France 1.2% 1.8% 3.4%
Germany 1.2% 1.9% 3.5%
India 0.6% 1.0% 4.0%
Italy 0.9% 1.3% 2.8%
Japan 1.1% 2.2% 4.6%
Mexico 0.5% 1.2% 3.9%
Russia - 1.2% 3.3%
United Kingdom 1.3% 2.5% 4.2%
Africa 1.4% 1.5% 4.7%
Other Asia 2.3% 3.6% 6.8%
Other Europe 1.1% 1.7% 3.5%
Other Latin America 1.0% 1.5% 3.7%
Average 1.1% 1.8% 3.9%
Notes: Entries are manufacturing imports from China/total manufacturing expenditure. We have no trade
data for Russia until 1996.
28Table 6: Estimated elasticities and productivity growth
SITC ￿ ￿ 4
Organic chemicals 51 3.1 2.6 9.5%
Inorganic chemicals 52 9.5 9.5 9.1%
Coloring materials 53 3.9 3.7 13.6%
Pharmaceuticals 54 7.8 9.0 22.5%
Cleaning products 55 5.5 5.6 24.3%
Fertilizers 56 11.3 11.0 8.9%
Plastics (primary) 57 17.7 24.0 14.2%
Plastics (non-primary) 58 2.6 2.1 12.2%
Chemical products 59 3.5 3.1 13.0%
Leather manufactures 61 6.8 7.3 9.4%
Rubber manufactures 62 6.1 5.6 12.8%
Wood manufactures 63 3.8 4.0 13.8%
Paper articles 64 5.8 5.9 11.0%
Yarn and fabrics 65 2.7 2.0 7.4%
Mineral manufactures 66 6.3 7.4 15.5%
Iron and steel 67 3.6 2.9 11.8%
Metal manufactures 69 3.5 3.5 13.0%
Power generators 71 3.4 2.5 17.7%
Specialized machinery 72 7.6 8.0 16.3%
Metalworking machinery 73 19.5 22.0 13.5%
Industrial machinery 74 6.1 6.3 18.3%
O¢ ce machines 75 1.7 0.8 17.6%
Telecom. equipment 76 2.4 1.4 19.7%
Electrical machinery 77 6.5 6.4 16.1%
Road vehicles 78 5.1 4.7 15.3%
Other transp. equipment 79 15.7 14.9 13.9%
Fixtures and ￿ttings 81 13.9 16.4 13.8%
Furniture 82 5.3 6.0 13.0%
Travel goods 83 14.8 19.9 9.5%
Apparel and clothing 84 8.8 11.1 10.0%
Footwear 85 16.3 16.1 7.4%
Professional instruments 87 6.7 7.1 18.7%
Optical goods 88 8.1 7.9 14.7%
Misc. manufactures 89 7.1 8.1 12.8%
Average - 7.4 7.9 13.8%
Notes: Entries are short industry descriptions, SITC codes (revision 3), estimated ￿, estimated ￿, and the
geometric averages of the estimated
4
 =b ¬1 over all years.
29TABLE 7: Welfare Gains from China￿ s Productivity Growth
China World Rest of World Share Rest of World
1995 14.4% 0.91% 0.018% 2.0%
1996 14.9% 0.79% 0.025% 3.1%
1997 15.4% 0.79% 0.039% 4.9%
1998 15.5% 1.06% 0.025% 2.4%
1999 15.7% 1.12% 0.025% 2.3%
2000 15.8% 1.25% 0.034% 2.7%
2001 15.5% 1.31% 0.043% 3.3%
2002 15.4% 1.47% 0.054% 3.7%
2003 15.1% 1.56% 0.064% 4.1%
2004 14.9% 1.66% 0.092% 5.5%
2005 14.9% 2.13% 0.061% 2.8%
2006 14.3% 2.47% 0.076% 3.1%
2007 14.1% 2.88% 0.075% 2.6%
1995-2007 520.5% 21.18% 0.634% 3.0%
Notes: Entries are predicted welfare changes from productivity growth in China. World welfare gain is average
welfare gain in the world weighted by each country￿ s output share. Rest of World refers to countries other
than China. 1995-2007 welfare gain (last row) is cumulative welfare gain from 1995 to 2007.
30TABLE 8: Decomposition of Welfare Gains from China￿ s Productivity Growth
Welfare ￿ Terms-of-trade + Home market = Sum
United States 0.38% 1.20% -0.59% 0.61%
Argentina 0.09% 0.34% -0.21% 0.13%
Brazil 0.18% 0.28% -0.10% 0.18%
Canada -0.06% 0.69% -0.65% 0.04%
France -1.13% 1.10% -2.05% -0.95%
Germany 0.50% 0.64% -0.18% 0.46%
India 0.55% 0.51% 0.03% 0.54%
Italy 0.11% 0.52% -0.63% -0.11%
Japan 1.30% 0.40% 0.99% 1.39%
Mexico 0.24% 0.82% -0.51% 0.31%
Russia -1.23% 1.12% -1.91% -0.79%
United Kingdom 0.04% 0.64% -0.50% 0.14%
Africa -0.25% 0.44% -0.50% -0.06%
Other Asia 3.64% 1.34% 2.61% 3.95%
Other Europe 0.27% 0.53% -0.20% 0.33%
Other Latin America 0.07% 0.29% -0.15% 0.14%
Average 0.29% 0.68% -0.28% 0.40%
Notes: Entries are cumulative e⁄ects from 1995 to 2007 from China￿ s productivity growth. Column 1 gives net
welfare gain following equation (10), columns 2-3 the terms-of-trade e⁄ects and home market e⁄ects following
equation (11), and column 4 the sum of columns 2-3. We have no trade data for Russia until 1996 so that all
entries for Russia refer to the years 1996 to 2007 only.
31TABLE 9: Decomposition of Terms-of-Trade E⁄ects from China￿ s Productivity Growth
Terms-of-trade = Bilateral + Multilateral
United States 1.20% 1.18% 0.02%
Argentina 0.34% 0.32% 0.02%
Brazil 0.28% 0.33% -0.05%
Canada 0.69% 0.62% 0.07%
France 1.10% 0.61% 0.49%
Germany 0.64% 0.71% -0.07%
India 0.51% 0.55% -0.04%
Italy 0.52% 0.26% 0.26%
Japan 0.40% 0.48% -0.08%
Mexico 0.82% 0.86% -0.04%
Russia 1.12% 0.01% 1.11%
United Kingdom 0.64% 0.59% 0.05%
Africa 0.44% 0.37% 0.07%
Other Asia 1.34% 1.40% -0.06%
Other Europe 0.53% 0.59% -0.06%
Other Latin America 0.29% 0.29% 0.00%
Average 0.68% 0.57% 0.11%
Notes: Entries are cumulative e⁄ects from 1995 to 2007 from China￿ s productivity growth. Column 1 gives the
terms-of-trade e⁄ect following equation (11). Columns 2 and 3 decompose this into the bilateral terms-of-trade
e⁄ect vis-a-vis China and the multilateral terms-of-trade e⁄ect vis-a-vis all countries other than China. We
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Figure 1: Distribution of productivity growth across manufacturing industries in China
Notes: This is a kernel density plot of the geometric average of the estimated annual productivity growth rates
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Figure 2: Industry productivity growth and industry net exports in China
Notes: This ￿gure plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and normalized industry net
exports in China. Productivity growth is computed as in Figure 1. Industry net exports are computed as the
simple average of industry net exports from 1995-2007. Total trade is computed as the simple average of the
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Figure 3: Industry productivity growth and industry trade elasticities in China
Notes: This ￿gure plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and industry trade elasticities
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Figure 4: Distribution of predicted changes in wages relative to China￿ s wage
Notes: This is a kernel density plot of the simple average of the predicted annual changes in wages relative to
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Figure 5: Industry entry and industry productivity growth/trade elasticities in China
Notes: The upper panel plots the relationship between industry productivity growth and industry entry in
China. The lower panels plots the relationship between industry trade elasticities and industry entry in China.
Productivity growth is computed as in Figure 1. Industry entry is computed as the simple average of the
predicted annual changes in the number of industry entrants from 1995-2007. The line is a linear regression
line.
37